“After the nuclear deal, the IAEA's access to (Iran’s) non-nuclear sites would be merely based on the framework of the Additional Protocol,” Seyed Abbas Araqchi said, speaking to reporters after a Thursday meeting with the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano.
Araqchi, who is also a deputy foreign minister, went on to say that the IAEA’s access to the facilities would have its own conditions based on the Additional Protocol, and will be limited to “environmental sampling”.
Also in a Thursday interview with IRIB, Araqchi emphasized that should Iran approve to implement the Additional Protocol, the IAEA would have a series of managed access to non-nuclear sites under special conditions.
“What the IAEA does is not an inspection, but a managed access for environmental sampling to check whether there is any radioactive substances there,” he added, stressing that no such thing as “inspection of military sites” exists within the framework of the Additional Protocol.
Earlier in a Tuesday Associated Press interview, Amano had noted that Iran specifically agreed to implement what's known as the agency's "Additional Protocol" when it agreed to the outlines of the deal now being worked on.
“In many other countries from time to time we request access to military sites when we have the reason to, so why not Iran?” he said. “If we have a reason to request access, we will do so, and in principle Iran has to accept it.”
Later and in reaction to Amano’s remarks, Spokesman for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Behrouz Kamalvandi said that the remarks are “his (Amano's) own interpretation”.
Firstly, the Islamic Republic has not approved or implemented the additional protocol yet, he said, adding that secondly, in the provisions of the protocol, there is no specific obligation for signatory countries to allow access to their military sites.
Earlier on April 9, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei categorically rejected foreign access to the country’s “security and defensive” sectors under the pretext of nuclear monitoring.